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s h e il a

M cD o n a l d

T H E WAR A FTER T H E WAR:
F O R T K EN T BLOCKHOUSE, 1839-1842
O n M arch 23, 1839, the M aine State L egislature passed a
resolve rem oving M aine’s m ilitia from the brink of conflict in
the Aroostook War. O n that day, the Fort Kent blockhouse,
destined to become one of the most enduring symbols of the
war, was still six m onths away from construction at the conflu
ence of the Fish and St. Jo h n rivers.
Fort Kent did not rise out of bom bast and calls to arms. It
instead assumed its very strategic location gradually as M aine
pushed to establish a toe-hold in the territory claim ed by both
Great B ritain and the U nited States under the nebulous terms
of the T reaty of Paris signed in 1783. F ollow ing its construc
tion in the closing m onths of 1839, Fort Kent stood as the chief
guardian of A m erican and M aine interests for three years w hile
boundary negotiations dragged on in national capitals, and
w hile neighboring British and American concerns, w ho shared
the shores of the St. Jo h n River, struck an often tense balance of
power.
In its tenuous position, Fort Kent was at once part of
several worlds. From a M aine perspective, it was in the m iddle
of a large, tim ber-rich area that M aine claim ed as hers accord
ing to the boundary defined in the Treaty of Paris. Practically,
however, Fort Kent was at the edge of the wilderness, lying a
great distance n orth of M aine’s p opulation centers and separ
ated by miles of virtually uncharted territory w ithout benefit of
roads or easily usable river routes.
Fort Kent, alth o u g h far from the rest of the state, was also
in the m iddle of a sm all American settlement, w hich had been
established aro u n d 1817 along the St. Jo h n River. T h is settle
m ent was geographically distinct from the French com m unity
between G ran d Falls and the m outh of the Madawaska. It
began twelve miles upriver from the m outh of the M adawaska
and extended another twenty miles to the m o u th of the St.
Francis. Described as “uninhabited and u n im proved” p rior to
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During the 1839 “war,” the territory north of Fort Fairfield was largely inaccessible by land. The Fish
River road, built over the next few years, provided a land route to the state’s northernmost fortifica
tion: the boom and blockhouse at Fort Kent. "A Circular from the Land Office Descriptive of the
Public Lands of Maine, 1888,” courtesy of the author.
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the A m ericans’ arrival, this area became defined as the disputed
territory’s American settlement as tensions grew between
M aine and New Brunswick in the 1820s.1As a friendly base of
operations for M aine officials who took censuses and issued
land grants along the river, the A merican settlem ent helped set
the stage for the establishm ent of Fort Kent a decade later.
From a New Brunsw ick perspective, Fort Kent was not at
the end of the line. Rather, it stood near a m ajor east-west
transportation and com m unication route that extended along
the St. Jo h n River between Saint Jo h n , New Brunswick, and
the m outh of the Madawaska. T his route, w hich G reat Britain
had deliberately settled and secured w ith Acadian and FrenchC anadian im m igrants, served as a vital link between C anada’s
m aritim e and Quebec provinces. Great Britain also claimed the
territory su rrounding the St. Jo h n River under terms of the
Treaty of Paris, and saw Fort Kent as a threat to that claim and
the rich resource and logistical advantages it held.
M aine’s claim s to the territory and resources in the Fish
and St. Jo h n river areas were subjects of concern in state and
national capitals long before Fort Kent was built. Extensive
tim ber depredations by New Brunswick trespassers had been
reported there in 1825, and M aine and M assachusetts land
agents were sent north to investigate. A July 4 celebration in the
area's American settlem ent in 1827 resulted in the arrest of a
local leader by New Brunswick officials. Likewise, a town
m eeting held in 1831 to elect representatives to the M aine
Legislature resulted in heightened tensions and threats of
arrest. It was not u n til 1839 that the fits and starts of a half
century of contention over the boundary’s location erupted.
After this brief encounter, M aine began the cum bersom e p ro 
cess of establishing and sustaining a presence in the disputed
territory against geographical, historical, and logistical odds.
These efforts w ould focus on Fort Kent.
J o h n Fairfield began his term as governor in 1839 by
issuing a confidential com m unication to the legislature that
many men from the British provinces were trespassing exten
sively and cu ttin g tim ber on northern lands claim ed by Maine.
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These people, ineluding from fifty to seventy-five on the Fish
River, ’’not only refuse to desist,” wrote Fairfield, “but defy the
pow er of this G overnm ent to prevent their cu ttin g tim ber to
any extent they please.” - Faced w ith these depredations, and
the estimated loss of $ 100,000 w orth of timber, the governor and
legislature authorized $10,000 for L and Agent R ufus M clntire
to “em ploy a sufficient force to arrest, detain, and im prison all
persons found trespassing on the territory of this state as
bounded and established by the Treaty of 1783.
Arrests, captures, and threats on both sides followed Mclntire’s arrival w ith a posse of 200 in the territory su rro u n d in g the
Aroostook River. New B runsw ick’s L ieutenant G overnor Jo h n
Harvey moved troops into the area, protested M aine’s actions,
and called u p o n Fairfield to w ithdraw the forces. O therwise, he
wrote, “I m ust proceed to take m ilitary occupation of the
territory.’M
Fairfield, believing that “collision is inevitable,” advo
cated sending a m ilitary force of at least 10,000 to “meet the
troops of Sir Jo h n Harvey and resist his insolent pretensions to
drive us from o u r soil.” 3 O n February 20, 1839, the legislature
passed a resolve m andating that a m ilitia jo in the civil posse in
the territory on the Aroostook and St. Jo h n rivers, “at such
points as may be best adapted to the object to prevent further
depredations on the public lands .... ”6 W ith this, the Aroostook
War officially began. As L and Agent M clntire later wrote, “ the
proceedings against individual trespassers, was merged for a
time, in the ag itatio n of the general question of jurisdiction
and occupancy."7
In this agitation, actions of both the civil posse and the
m ilitia focused on the Aroostook River and the area near the
eastern in tern atio n al border. Here, troops worked first to estab
lish posts, defensive works, and a strong presence to dissuade
trespassers. M aine’s officials were aware of tim ber depredations
on the Fish River. G overnor Fairfield had suggested to the
legislature on Jan u ary 23 that the land agent proceed to the
river “ if practicable.”8 But the tru th was that a m ajor effort was
not practicable, in large part due to the lack of roads. Despite at
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least two surveys since 1826 to lay out a road from the m outh of
the M attaw am keag River to the Fish River, actual construction
had only progressed as far as Masardis. T h at stretch of road was
prim arily suited for w inter travel and the rem ainder of the
route north to the Fish River was a treacherous series of w ater
ways and portages. On March 8, the legislature, undoubtedly
aware of the transportation problems, passed a resolve direct
ing the land agent to expend $10,000 “for the extension of the
Aroostook Road from the Aroostook to the St. Jo h n s [sic]
river.”9
T he lack of roads to the Fish and St. Jo h n rivers lim ited the
posse’s defensive and offensive operations to sm all groups that
could move quickly through the largely uncharted wilderness.
One such group left on February 24 to break u p a gang of
trespassers on the Fish River.10They likely returned to the posts
along the Aroostook River follow ing the com pletion of their
task. They were followed by others who reconnoitered the
woods between the Aroostook and St. Jo h n to m onitor New
Brunswick troops.11
By March, these groups had inform ed L and Agent Mclntire at Fort Fairfield that provincial and regular forces were
concentrating at G rand Falls on the St. Jo h n and that a large
num ber of axes had also been sent up the river. “It is sug
gested,” wrote M clntire to Governor Fairfield, “ that a move
m ent may be made through the woods from M adawaska to
some p o in t on the Aroostook above us — possibly through Fish
River to the M achias w hile the m ilitia may move directly to this
post.” 12
W ith these threats from the St. Jo h n and Fish rivers, and
the prospect of continued timber depredations in the spring,
M aine officials likely judged that the establishm ent of a post on
the Fish River could no longer be delayed. O n M arch 27, 1839,
Provisional L and Agent Charles Jarvis ordered C aptain Alvin
Nye and tw enty-three volunteers from the civil posse and the
m ilitia to the St. J o h n .13 Jarvis instructed Nye that his first
object, after arriving and sending back his teams, was to deter
m ine the best location for a boom to stop the passage of tim ber
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dow n the Fish River to the St. Jo h n . Nye was then to prepare
good accom m odations and “calculate the cam p as that it may
be ... used as a block house for defense of the Boom ... against
the attack of the M ob.” T he next priority, instructed Jarvis, was
the construction of the boom. “S hould you be threatened by an
E nglish G overnm ent fo rc e /’ continued Jarvis, “you m ust exer
cise your ow n discretion as to resistance .... If threatened by
such a force you m ust m ake the best terms you can .... ’’ In no
event was Nye to cross the St. Jo h n . T his, Jarvis w arned, w ould
constitute a violation of the jurisdictional lim its of New
B runsw ick.14
Ironically, and unk n o w n to Jarvis and Nye, the Aroostook
War officially ended ju st as Jarvis was h elp in g to stage the
expedition to the Fish River. O n March 25, both sides w ithdrew
their m ilitary forces, and the M aine m ilitia was instructed to
make p rep aratio n s for their retu rn from the A roostook.15 Since
this in fo rm atio n had not yet reached Masardis, Nye and his
force departed for the Fish River on March 28.
Jarvis learned that the war had ended and the troops had
been recalled on M arch 29. A messenger carried a dispatch from
m ilitia com m ander G eneral Isaac H odsdon ordering the recall
of the Fish River detachm ent and the troops rem ain in g at
M asardis.16 Jarvis, at odds w ith H odsdon over cooperation
between the m ilitia and the civil posse, asserted that the m ilitia
members in N ye’s contingent had leaves of absence. H e wrote to
G overnor Fairfield: “I may be w rong in this but it appears to
me im p o rtan t in the present posture of affairs, to establish the
question of o u r ju risd ictio n beyond all cavil on the waters of
the Fish R iv e r/’17
Despite Ja rv is’s wishes, N ye’s expedition was notified en
route of G eneral H o d sd o n ’s orders and was obliged to return to
the Masardis post. All but two of the m ilitia accepted H ods
d o n ’s recall, an d Jarvis made a hasty trip to Fort Fairfield to
recruit twenty members of the civil posse to replace th em .18 Nye
departed again for the Fish River w ith instructions from Jarvis
to clear land adjacent to the post and sow it w ith grass seed.
T h is w ould provide forage for anim als that w ould be used in
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road building. R em inding Nye that his post w ould have to be
largely self-sufficient in the remote Fish River area, Jarvis
suggested that potatoes and turnips be p lan ted as soon as
possible and that Nye should m anage the forces under his
com m and “as if they were in your em ploy for com m encing a
large farm, having their arms at h an d .’’19
Nye and his troops faced an arduous passage to the Fish
River. They traveled u p the L ittle Machias, across the portage
to the southernm ost of the Fish River lakes, dow n the lakes and
thoroughfares — some of w hich were no longer frozen — and
down the Fish River.20 A pproxim ately eight and a half miles
upriver from the m outh of the Fish River, at present-day Sold
ier Pond, they stopped to establish their post. W riting to Jarvis
on April 23 from that location (which Nye perhaps facetiously
called Fort Jarvis), Nye reported that they had com pleted a
boom 400 feet in length across the Fish River and that the
blockhouse was nearly finished. “We shall move in the house
tom orrow ,” he wrote, “it is very strong b u ilt... of hewn tim ber
20 inches thick .... T h e French have been here and they are glad
that we Americans are going to have their lan d .”21
In the same letter, Nye also m entioned to Jarvis the possi
bility of constructing a boom at the m outh of the river. T he
English, he reported, had surveyed the ground on the opposite
bank and were p la n n in g to build a blockhouse.22 T his notion,
derived from an indeterm inate source, was the seed that led to
the establishm ent of Fort Kent. It also began a confused and
contentious struggle between M aine and New Brunswick, and
their respective national governm ents, over the character and
lim its of M aine’s presence in the territory alo n g the St. Jo h n
River.
C o n te n tio n s stemmed from an agreem ent forged by
General W infield Scott and signed by G overnor Fairfield and
L ieutenant G overnor Harvey in March 1839. T h is accord did
not establish the international border, but sim ply ended the
war and provided a means for the state and province to coexist
w hile the boundary was being negotiated. A key p art of the
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A reproduction of the Plan of Aroostook and Fish River Road Surveyed and located. July, August and September 1839. The map
drawn some time after the date indicated shows the Fort Kent blockhouse as well as the earlier fortification at Soldier Pond.
T h e d a rk b lo b s o n th e sk e tc h (g re e n in th e o rig in a l) a re
"h a rd w o o d s w e lls o f la n d o v e r a n d b y w h ic h th e ro a d
p a s se s ". M a in e S ta te L ib ra ry c o lle c tio n s , c o u r te s y o f
the author.

a greement was tha t Maine and New Brunswick would eac h
hold in possession some pan ol (he disputed t e n d o n . New
Brunswick thus held die' Madawaska settlement, and Maine,
the* te ii iton aloni; the* Aroostook River. Neither j j o v m m u ’nt
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conceded the ultim ate right of the other to the territory under
its jurisdiction. T he exact m eaning of this agreem ent was
unclear and interpreted variously by each n ation to forward its
aims, especially concerning the territory along the St. Jo h n
River. T h is area consequently became a focus of contention
follow ing the Aroostook War.
A m onth after Nye had suggested the advisability of a
boom at the m o u th of the Fish River, a m em ber of the New
Brunswick m ilitia, sent to investigate the area, reported the
existence of a force there. Jo h n Sutton related that about
twenty-five Americans had erected a camp on an island in the
St. Jo h n opposite the m outh of the Fish River. T h e cam p had
two sentries, one at each end of the island, w ith fixed bayonets.
Sutton apparently spoke w ith C aptain Nye and was inform ed
that Nye was em powered to protect and detain timber, and that
his jurisdiction extended over the w hole disputed territory.23
Sutton's report stirred protests by the New Brunswick
governm ent. In early Ju n e L and Agent M clntire met in Bangor
w ith T hom as Baillie, the com missioner of crown lands for the
province of New Brunswick. M clntire acknowledged that Nye
had exceeded his instructions by m oving a p o rtio n of the posse
to the island and reported that he had ordered Nye to confine
his posse to the Fish River.24
Referring to the March 1839 agreement between Fairfield
and Harvey that gave jurisdiction of the M adawaska settlem ent
to New Brunswick, M clntire told Baillie that he perceived a
difference of o p in io n between the two governm ents as to w hat
constituted the Madawaska settlement. T he Americans, he
stated, supposed that only the north bank of the St. Jo h n was so
called (and in fact Nye’s instructions strictly stated that he
should not cross the St. Jo h n to the north).25 G reat Britain, on
the other hand, considered all her subjects on the St. Jo h n , both
to the n o rth and south, above G rand Falls as part of the M ada
waska settlem ent. M clntire also reported to Baillie that M aine
was surveying a road, to be started w ithout delay, from the
A roostook to the Fish River, where the posse had b uilt the
boom and blockhouse. Baillie remarked that the road — indeed
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any A m erican presence on the St. Jo h n — w ould be considered
interference w ith British ju risd ictio n .26
M clntire’s assurances that Nye had been recalled to the
post eight and a half miles away from the river may have
appeared to Baillie as an acquiescence to G reat B ritain ’s
claims. M aine officials had, however, no intention of acceding
so readily. M clntire prom ised the w ithdraw al not because he
believed in G reat B ritain ’s jurisdiction on both sides of the
river, but because M aine had no means of su stain in g and su p 
plying a force ' ‘sufficient to take a post on the St. J o h n ’s [sic].”27
As M clntire wrote to Fairfield:
I know it was your w ish if practicable to have a party
on the south bank of the St. J o h n ’s .... I supposed,
however that it w ould not be desirable to do so unless
it could be done effectually and not by a weak force
that m ight be forced or defeated in their object by
bands of [timber] trespassers.28
T hus, w hile officials in state, provincial, and n atio n al capitals
fielded com plaints of infractions of the March 1839 agreem ent
and negotiators tried to set the international boundary, M aine
began to position itself on the St. John.
T h e m ission, as far as M aine’s governm ent, land agent,
and civil posse were concerned, was clear. T hey had authority
in the agreem ent w ith New Brunsw ick to “protect the tim ber
recently cut and to prevent further depredations.” 29 M aine offi
cials were certainly aware of the other advantages such a move
w ould bring, however. Over the past fifteen years M aine had
developed an interest in the St. Jo h n River and hoped to
embrace the territory w ithin the state’s borders and draw the
fruits of its fields and forests to the state. A post on the St. Jo h n
w ould bring those interests one step closer to reality.
Accordingly, Maine, through the land agent, launched
two efforts to facilitate the posse’s presence on the south bank of
the St. Jo h n River. In late May 1839, C aptain Nye and his posse,
w ho had not likely retreated from the St. Jo h n River as p ro m 
ised, constructed a “slight tem porary boom stretched across the
channel, between the Island and southern Maine lan d .” W ith
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this, the posse stopped between six and eight hundred tons of
timber. Convinced of the strategic im portance of the St. Jo h n ,
the land agent turned his thoughts to a more substantial boom.
Charles Jarvis encouraged this thinking. A boom of about 300
feet connecting the island to the m ainland, supplem ented by a
guide boom at the u pper part of the island to direct every stick
of tim ber into the southern channel w ould serve well, he wrote.
“Indeed it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a boom
could be erected on so large a river, w ith so m uch security, at so
little expense, and at the same time to answer so effectually the
purpose intended.”30
M aine also opened a road from the Aroostook River at the
m outh of the L ittle Machias to the Fish River. M clntire placed
Jarvis in charge of this d au n tin g task, w hich m eant orchestrat
ing plans, coordinating work crews, and m ustering supplies to
clear nearly forty-five miles of road. In au th o rizin g money for
the road work, the M aine legislature had perm itted a certain
latitude in selecting a route. M clntire and Jarvis thus made a
strategic alteration in the ro ad ’s course so that it could meet the
St. Jo h n at the m outh of the Fish River. Here, it could best serve
M aine’s purpose of establishing an American posse at the
m outh of the Fish.31
After four m onths of work from late Ju ly through late
October 1839, Jarvis pronounced the road com pleted at a cost of
$8,514. H e described his personal inspection tour:
T h e route was perform ed w ith ease, and w ithout the
slightest accident. From this day, then, may be dated
the op en in g of the fine valley of the St. J o h n ’s to the
rest of the State, from w hich u n til now it has been
separated by an im passable barrier of forty-five miles
of unbroken forest.32
T h e idea of boom ing the St. Jo h n River thus evolved from
“utterly chim erical,” as Charles Jarvis wrote, to “easy of execu
tio n .” 33 W ith a road from the Aroostook to the St. Jo h n in
place, it w ould not be long before M aine’s civil posse moved to
take full advantage of a position at the Fish River's m outh. In
August, a veteran of the posse’s actions in the disputed terri
tory, C aptain Stover Rines, was sum m oned to relieve C aptain
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Nye at Fish River.34 Rines probably arrived the next m onth and
began w orking w ith Jarvis to establish the post, w hich w ould
eventually be know n as Fort Kent.
R in es’s force at the m o u th of the Fish River grew to a total
of thirty-five by the year s end. T h e w ork that lay ahead for this
division of the civil posse was especially form idable due to the
season. As three w ho “ en listed in to em p lo y m en t” there
described, “w hen we arrived here [in October], the w eather was
cold and our situ atio n was very uncom fortable on account of
having no suitable buildings in w hich to live.”35 Rines, how 
ever, was anxious to com plete the necessary business and joined
the crew in the hard w ork of establishing the post, w ith its
blockhouse, cookhouse and other buildings, and boom.
Once again the posse’s preem ptive move to the m outh of
the Fish River did not escape the attention of B ritish officials.
T h e protests of November 1839, conveyed through diplom atic
chanhels to G overnor Fairfield, did not vary substantively from
earlier com plaints about M aine’s actions on the St. John. T he
arm ed posse, asserted B ritish M inister H enry S. Fox, had taken
on a m ilitary posture “som ething more like a perm anent
national possession.” T h e road connecting the Fish River to
Bangor, together w ith authorized land grants in the disputed
territory, constituted additional infractions.36
Asked to ex p lain Fox's charges, Fairfield replied in a letter
to President M artin Van Buren that the posse at the m outh of
the Fish River had done n o th in g but w hat was necessary to
prevent tim ber depredations, as authorized in the March 1839
agreem ent. Further, Fairfield characterized the posse as hired
labor, not a m ilitia, protecting public property. And finally,
w rote Fairfield, neither the construction of a road nor the
m arking and selling of lots represented new initiatives on the
part of M aine. R ather both activities had been in process in the
territory for a num ber of years and w ith “no propriety could ...
be made a m atter of com p lain t.”37
Fairfield had cause for indignation, for M aine officials
were docum enting sim ilar actions by British provincial forces.
From M aine’s perspective, British troops were taking on an
overtly th reaten in g tone in the area. Fifty members of the
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B ritish m ilitia, “bearing the queen's arms, and otherw ise su it
ably equipped, headed by a veteran m ilitia captain, made an
assault in the dead of n ig h t” upon M aine’s new St. Jo h n River
post.38 Rines had also reported that 200 British troops were
quartered at the head of Tem iscouata Lake on the road to
Low er Canada, and that m ilitary buildings were under con
struction at the foot of the lake and up o n either side of the St.
Jo h n at the m outh of the M adawaska.39Jo h n Baker, a firebrand
from the St. Jo h n Valley’s A merican settlement, reported that a
British arm ed force on the m arch to M adawaska had disclosed
an intention of destroying the Fish River establishm ent. In
December, a British officer had em ployed Baker's neighbor to
ferry him to Fish River at night. As they approached the garri
son, Baker related, they were discovered by the sentinel. T he
officer retreated, saying that the post “should be destroyed by
New Year’s D ay.”40
Ironically, the post at Fish River was likely m uch less a
threat than the British im agined. T h e land ag en t’s office was
very short of money to support the activity there, and, despite
the new road, su p p ly in g it was difficult.41 T he post was w ith 
out a cannon and Rines was instructed to reduce the force there
to twenty-five, due to a shortage of funds. M clntire com plained
that he found it “im possible to raise funds to meet the am ount
of expenses and pay off what is due the men .... ” 42
T he jux tap o sitio n of M aine’s posse and the British m il
itary continued as a po in t of contention, however, through
1840. Fox continued to deny that Great Britain had increased
troops in the territory and called for M aine to retire from the
valley of the St. Jo h n and confine its operations to the Aroos
took, thereby placing itself in the situation where it stood prior
to the March 1839 agreem ent.43 T he M aine legislature called on
the federal governm ent to take m ilitary possession of the dis
puted territory unless the British government made a satisfac
tory proposal to end the boundary question. T h e legislature
appeared once more on the brink of sending troops to war w hen
it asserted in a March 1840 resolve that, should the federal
governm ent’s actions prove disappointing, "it w ill become the
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im perative duty of M aine to assume the defense of o ur state and
natio n al honor, and expel from our lim its the British troops
now quartered u p o n our territory.”44
I n their own way, M aine’s land agent and the posse at Fish
River responded to the heightening tensions. Despite the per
sisting financial problem s in his office, L and Agent M clntire
wrote to Stover Rines in A pril 1840 that he had decided a larger
force at Fish River was w arranted, “lest it m ight appear we were
abandoning the post .... ”45 M clntire continued:
You w ill see by the papers that the object of our post
at Fish River and the English troops at M adawaska is
the m atter of a controversy. O ur general governm ent
has taken the rig h t ground, and fully sustained us. It
is im p o rtan t therefore we stand fast where we are, and
give no new occasion to change the question. I th in k
no attem pt w ill be made to drive you off by force
unless war is determ ined on. But it is still im p o rtan t
you keep guarded and not be taken by surprise.46
Despite these brave words, M clntire concluded the letter w ith a
su rp risin g announcem ent concerning his cram ped budget and
his plans for Rines:
Now the booms and buildings have been com pleted.
I th in k the business in the future w ill n o t require the
same skill and qualifications and that a m an fully
com petent to the duties for the com ing season can be
em ployed for about two dollars a day. I w ould not ask
you to stay for that wage unless you choose to .... If
you th in k that com pensation not enough, please n o t
ify me im m ediately and I will send someone to relieve
you if you w ish it, but I wish you to rem ain u n til
relieved. You m ust consult your own feeling and
wishes in the matter. If you are relieved, your succes
sor will n o t receive m ore than the sum I nam e.”47
Nevertheless, Rines continued at the Fish River post, supervis
ing the labors of eighteen m en.48 As m onth after m onth passed
w ith boundary negotiations stalled in the national capitals,
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tensions eased somewhat, and the day-to-day operations of the
post assum ed m ore the character of a farm than a fort girded
against im m inent siege. Rines had directed considerable im 
provem ents in the post's agricultural operations, to the extent
that they could nearly cover all the expenses.49 A settler de
scribed the conditions there:
I am pleased to testify to the general appearance of
neatness and propriety observable in the conduct of
the affairs and especially in the cook and Block
houses whose appearances show a very proper degree
of attention to decorum and economy.50
Reflecting the current lull in tensions, M clntire inform ed
Rines that, if m atters rem ained quiet, the num ber at the Fish
River post could be reduced to twelve once the season’s crop
was secured.51
Amid this delicate calm, it took only one event along the
St. Jo h n River to renew the threats of o u trig h t conflict. T h a t
event took place in November 1840, w hen the valley’s A m eri
cans met at the Fish River settlem ent to cast their votes in that
year's presidential election. Provoked by this gathering, New
Brunswick m agistrate Francis Rice, who lived in the province’s
M adawaska settlement, presented him self at the m eeting and,
by virtue of his authority, attem pted to disperse the people
there. Rice was consequently threatened and driven from the
meeting.
L ieutenant G overnor Harvey inform ed G overnor Fairfield
that Rice had been “grossly insulted, threatened w ith personal
violence, and obstructed in the discharge of this duty by persons
professing to be citizens of the State of M aine.” 52 Jam es
M acLauchlan, the provincial warden of the disputed territory,
had also been threatened, apparently on another occasion, in
the discharge of his duties by “the person in charge of the armed
posse stationed at Fish River.”53 Fairfield replied that “instead
of finding the acts against Rice reprehensible,” he could “only
wonder at [R ines’s] forbearance in not causing him [Rice] to be
arrested and subjected to trial and p u n ish m en t.”54 These
attacks on Rice and M acLauchlan provoked the governor
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general of the British provinces to move troops to the Madawaska settlem ent to “give support to the civil authorities of that
settlem ent.” 55 A significant step, this move represented the first
tim e — rum ors and American reports to the contrary — that
British troops openly established residence in the Madawaska
settlement. Personally, Harvey considered the actions a viola
tion of the M arch 1839 agreem ent and argued for a provincial
civil force, sim ilar to that at Fish River. H e was overruled,
however, and the m ilitary troops stayed. Fairfield lost no time
in forw arding the letters between him self and Harvey to Presi
dent Van Buren along w ith the follow ing harsh words:
M aine is again subjected to the m ortification of hav
in g foreign troops quartered u p o n her territory ....
T h a t the alleged causes are entirely insufficient to
justify so direct and palpable a breach of the subsist
in g agreem ent between the authorities of this State
and the Lieut. G overnor of the Province of New
B runsw ick is clear .... I trust that the Executive
G overnm ent of the U nited States will forthw ith take
measures to ensure the im m ediate w ithdraw al of
these troops from our territory, or to expel them .56
T h e federal governm ent’s reactions to M aine’s in d ig n a
tion b ro u g h t little more direct action than past responses to
flare-ups alo n g the St. Jo h n River. President Van Buren
assured M aine’s governm ental officials that the U nited States
and L ondon were in the process of negotiating for a boundary
survey to end the dispute, but past delays left G overnor Fairfield and his successor, Edward Kent, decidedly pessim istic.57
Follow ing a com prehensive com mittee report, the legisla
ture echoed G overnor Kent’s concerns and once again called
up o n the federal governm ent to fulfill its obligations and
m ain tain M aine’s rights to the territory by negotiation or arms.
T h e federal governm ent did, in fact, arrange for its troops to
take over the forts at the Aroostook and Fish rivers and relieve
the civil posses in A ugust 1841. Prior to that time, however,
M aine’s financially cram ped land agent’s office received help
from another q uarter in sustaining the civil posses in the
territory.
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T h a t help came from M assachusetts when, in February
1841, the land agents of M aine and M assachusetts jointly
ap p o in ted Zebulon Ingersoll to “sup erin ten d ” the protection
of public lands on the St. Jo h n .58 A lthough M assachusetts still
ow ned significant property in the disputed territory, the com 
m onw ealth had not contributed to financing any fortifications.
W hen finally asked by the M aine land agent in 1841, however,
M assachusetts L and Agent George Coffin “signified his entire
w illingness to defray one-half of all expenses necessary for the
p ro te c tio n of the p u b lic p ro p e rty on the n o rth e a ste rn
frontier.”59
In g erso ll’s w ork led him directly to evaluate the posses at
Fort F airfield and Fish River. H e prom ptly reduced the force at
Fort Fairfield, w hich had recently num bered as h ig h as thirtyfive, to a captain and three men, because the area aro u n d the
Aroostook River was under no im m ediate danger from tres
passers. T h e post at Fish River, however, was sustained at its
current strength of one captain and ten men, because of its
im portance in com m anding a large territory subject to exten
sive depredations.60
Fort Kent, as the post at Fish River came to be called in
1841, was im p o rtan t as a symbolic and tangible statem ent of
M aine’s land claim s in the volatile atm osphere alo n g the river.
T h e sensitivity of this position was not lost on either L and
Agent E lijah L. H am lin, who had replaced R ufus M clntire, or
on Massachusetts L and Agent George Coffin. T h e pair visited
the fort in Ju ly 1841 and learned that the British at M adawaska
were about to m ake a tax assessment upon all inhabitants of the
St. Jo h n , including those at Fort Kent. A scertaining that the
Am erican citizen Jo h n Baker had been once again arrested by a
New Brunswick officer, H am lin wrote that “under these cir
cumstances, we did not think it advisable to m ake any deduc
tion from the force at Fort Kent.”61
Coffin echoed H am lin 's analysis of the p o st’s im portance
and, in a letter to Massachusetts G overnor Jo h n Davis, gave a
description of the civil posse’s works there:
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At this place is a Block House built of hewn timber
(but not secured by a stockade), a cook house, stables,
and other convenient buildings, with the necessary
utensils suitable for farm ing purposes, and about
two hundred acres of land under good cultivation ...
and is stocked w ith w orking oxen, horses, and about
forty head of swine .... T his post is protected by a
Civil Posse, consisting of a C aptain and ten men and
effectually protects the booms across the river Saint
Jo h n s and over the m outh of the Fish River, thereby
securing from depredation all the tim ber on the St.
Jo h n s and Fish Rivers above this station, conse
quently this is a very im portant com mand, and
ought to be supported at all hazards.62
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H am lin dispatched a specially deputized sheriff to Fort Kent
w ith instructions to arrest anyone attem pting to collect the
tax .63 T h e dire reports from the St. Jo h n brought renewed calls
for federal troops to take possession of Forts Kent and Fairfield.
T his time, the request was granted. On A ugust 14, G eneral
W infield Scott directed Brigadier General Eustis at H ancock
Barracks in H o u lto n to select two com panies of the First Regi
m ent of A rtillery to relieve the arm ed civil posse at Forts Fairfield and Kent. President Jo h n T y ler’s objects in m aking this
move, wrote G eneral Scott, were to relieve the state of M aine
from the burden of keeping the posse, to preserve the tran q u il
ity of the territory w hile negotiations were pending, and to
protect the tim ber on the south shores of the St. Jo h n . T o allay
British concerns that the federal move to the territory signaled
heightened aggression, Scott instructed Eustis that the presi
d en t’s “pacific objects ought to be generally know n on both
sides of the river St. J o h n .’’64
C aptain L ucien B. Webster, com m anding C om pany C of
the First A rtillery, arrived at Fort Kent on September 17, 1841,
after an eleven day m arch from H oulton. Rines and one addi
tional m em ber of the posse at Fort Kent stayed under the state’s
employ to protect the state’s interests, w hich prim arily con
cerned tim ber harvesting in the territory.65
Webster and his com pany lost no time in trying to upgrade
both the physical and logistical situations at Fort Kent. T he
blockhouse was the only bu ild in g there, serving as both the
fort’s defensive work and quarters for the men. Webster re
ported that, u p o n his arrival, the blockhouse was in “an u n 
finished state,’’ needing new floors and other repairs.66 N one
theless, it was comfortable, according to Webster. He m ain 
tained the use of the blockhouse’s upper story and attic as
quarters, and the lower story as a guard house and clothing
store, while he concentrated on building a new officers’ q u ar
ters, w hich was suitable for use by April of the follow ing year.67
Webster's most im m ediate concern, however, was trans
portation and com m unication between Fort Kent and the rest
of the state, a fam iliar and as yet unsolved problem for virtually
every M aine civilian and m ilitary concern that had settled in
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the area. T h e forty-five mile road from the Aroostook River to
Fort Kent, described so glow ingly by Charles Jarvis two years
before, was, according to Webster, nearly im passable for loaded
w agons and dangerous to express riders because it passed
through a dense forest, over streams roughly bridged, and
across great distances “w ith o u t a single h u m an h ab itation or
shelter of any k in d .”68 As a result of the ro ad ’s poor quality,
wrote Webster to Assistant A djutant General R. Anderson, “we
are thus in a measure cut off from all com m unication w ith the
rest of the U. States, except that obtained by passing through
the British Provinces.” Webster estimated that a good road
from Fort Kent to the term ination of the state road at Masardis
w ould cost $57,000 — about $1,000 per m ile.69
T h e lack of postal service to Fort Kent proved to be another
vexing deficiency. T he fortification had to rely on the English
post office twenty-six miles downriver in Madawaska, or the
federal garrison at H oulton, 110 miles away. Webster described
Fort Kent as “ more inaccessible and in a region of fewer
resources than any other in the U n io n ,” a situation made more
deplorable by the proxim ity of “civil and m ilitary authorities
of a foreign pow er.” 70
T ensions between Fort Kent and that “foreign pow er” had
lessened considerably w ith the arrival of the federal troops.
R ather than view ing Webster and his C om pany C as a stronger
threat than Rines and the civil posse, the governm ent of New
Brunswick, according to M assachusetts L and Agent George
Coffin, “considered them as having a tendency to quiet the
borders.” 71 Webster also reported that “public feeling th ro u g h 
ou t this w hole line has not for years presented so q u iet and
peaceable an aspect as at present.” 72 H e apparently added his
ow n d ip lo m atic touch as well, extending courtesies to the
nearby E nglish officers. T h e costs of his efforts prom pted him
to request that Fort Kent receive double rations since there were
no hotels in the vicinity and because Webster was expected to
extend his courtesies to English officers stationed at the “four
posts in o u r vicin ity ” w ho “have m anifested every attention
and good feeling towards us, and are frequently o u r guests.” 73
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Despite its remoteness from sources of support in Maine,
Fort Kent evidenced other signs of growth. “O w ing to the new
and u n m ilitary condition of the post when taken possession by
the U. S. troops, the Com pany have had an u nusual quantity of
fatigue duty to attend to ,” wrote Webster at the inspection of
the post in September 1842.74 He reported the evidence of their
labors: new floors in the blockhouse; new quarters for the
officers; log huts for the com pany's laundresses; a hospital; and
a post school for the children of some ten soldiers. T here was
also a “very good post garden.”75
O n a diplom atic front, Secretary of State D aniel Webster
had taken a new course in the boundary negotiations. C on
vinced that the entire process m ust be salvaged from the in tri
cate maze of proposals and counterproposals that had dom i
nated the negotiations since the conclusion of the Aroostook
War, Webster began setting the stage at the end of 1841 for a
boundary by com promise. Maine officials had consistently
opposed a com prom ise line, insisting that the boundary as
described in the Treaty of Paris was the state’s true right. In
May 1842, however, the M aine legislature agreed to Webster's
proposal to ap p o in t com m issioners to act on behalf of the state
in negotiations on a com prom ise line.
After a m onth-long exchange, Webster, British envoy Lord
A shburton, and the com m issioners from M aine and M assachu
setts reached a settlem ent. O n A ugust 9, 1842, Webster and
A shburton signed the treaty that w ould establish the interna
tional boundary as it is know n today, and declare the right of
free navigation on the St. Jo h n for both nations. Factions in
M aine and New Brunswick and their respective national
governm ents each felt that justice had not been fully served, but
the agreement, know n com m only as the W ebster-Ashburton
Treaty and formally as the Treaty of W ashington, was p ro 
claim ed by both countries on November 10, 1842.
T h e process of effecting a new in tern atio n al border, where
formerly only a river had divided the people of the St. Jo h n
Valley, placed Fort Kent once more in a difficult position. T he
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first troubles came w ith a challenge by New Brunsw ick au th o r
ities to the treaty itself, w hen they arrested A m erican settler
D aniel Savage from an island south of the in tern atio n al border
in M arch 1843. C aptain Webster sent Fort Kent troops to p ro 
tect Savage a n d arrest the New Brunsw ick constable w ho held
him . New B runsw ick officials justified the arrest by arg u in g
that the W ebster-A shburton T reaty had not been sanctioned by
an act of P arliam en t and was consequently n u ll. T h e governor
of New B runsw ick later overruled local officials, and Webster
regarded the difficulties as settled.76 A merican residents in the
area still perceived a threat, however, if not from New B runs
wick officials then from C anadian lum berm en w ho had begun
w orking in the area. They expressed their fears in September
1843 w hen rum ors of a recall of troops from Fort Kent spread
through the valley.
You are probably aware ... that there is no organized
“civil au th o rity ” w hatever anyw here in this vicinity
and we are satisfied ... that the “T ro o p s” have been
the m eans of suppressing m uch strife and perhaps
bloodshed. But if the country was in any dangerous
state then, it is m uch m ore so now .... T h e C ountry
literally swarm s w ith strangers the p rin cip al p art of
w hom are foreign lum berm en well know n to be a
lawless, reckless class of men and very dangerous.77
T hey reported about 200 such m en on the St. Francis River,
w ho h ad been heard to threaten Fort Kent. U nder these circum 
stances, the settlers urged the continued occupation of the fort,
at least u n til the state could send a sufficient “civil force” to
protect them .78
Wishes of local settlers to the contrary, Webster and his
troops, alo n g w ith the troops at Fort Fairfield, were w ithdraw n
under the recom m endation of G eneral W infield Scott in Sep
tember 1843. F our com panies were left at H ancock Barracks in
H o u lto n “ to meet any border exigency that m ight occur higher
u p the fro n tier.” 79 Scott gave three m ilitary reasons for the
w ithdraw al: his troops were needed on the seaboard for the
preservation of im p o rtan t works; there was n o th in g of sim ilar
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im portance on either the Aroostook or Fish rivers w orthy of a
garrison; and the posts were distant, difficult, and expensive to
supply, especially Fort Kent, w hich could not be m aintained
except at the cost of a road and bridges.80 T h e Secretary of War
added that the federal governm ent should n o t be asked to
“perform the police duty of guarding the property of a state or
of individuals from expected trespasses .... ’’81
A state legislative com m ittee rem inded federal authorities
of other valid reasons for retaining the Fort Kent garrison: the
‘‘unchecked lawlessness’’ am ong certain elements of the border
area’s population; the great distance between Fort Kent and
H oulton; the French p o p u la tio n ’s lack of experience w ith
Am erican laws; the need for protection from “pow erful and
arm ed bands of foreign m arauders, encam ped u p o n a weak and
defenseless border’’; and finally, the constitutional obligations
of the federal governm ent.82 M aine w ill vote “regim ents w ith 
out stint for ... wherever the honor of the country dem ands
efforts and sacrifices,’’ the report concluded. “For herself, she
now asks the sm all force of forty men to protect her citizens
from the threatened invasion of ten times that num ber of law 
less foreigners.’’83 W ith that, the M aine legislature passed a
resolve on M arch 16, 1844, that the occupation of Fort Kent by
U. S. troops was necessary to protect the citizens and property of
M aine against foreign aggression. T h e legislature requested
that the governor forw ard both the report and the resolve to
President T yler.84 T h e actions of M aine yielded results: Federal
troops stayed at Fort Kent — at least u n til the follow ing year.
F o llo w in g Fort K ent’s m ilitary use, the blockhouse went
from federal, to state, to private ow nership between 1845 and
1858. In 1891, after the blockhouse had fallen into disrepair and
disuse, the M aine legislature authorized $300 to purchase the
structure, resolving to repair and preserve it.85 T h is act was the
first know n state-funded attem pt to preserve an historic fortifi
cation in the state of Maine, and was likely the earliest effort by
the state generally to undertake the preservation of an historic
building w ith pu b lic monies. T he precise motives are not part
of the historical record, but certainly the efforts to preserve the
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Fort Kent blockhouse, however, consciously driven, were wellplaced and ap p ro p riate for a state-funded initiative.
Fort Kent played a key role in form ing M aine’s boundaries
as they are know n today. It protected the state’s rights to a vital
tim ber resource and provided a p o in t of departure for both a
state and national presence in the area. Fort Kent also resulted
in the construction of a road w hich, although slow in full
realization, brought settlers into the northern portion of M aine
and eventually provided an im portant link to lands and p o p u 
lation centers to the south. Most im portantly, Fort K ent’s pres
ence in the harsh and rem ote environm ent along the St. Jo h n
River sustained, w ith persistent determ ination, M aine’s claims
to the disputed territory d u rin g the critical period between the
Aroostook War and the W ebster-Ashburton Treaty.
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